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Governments can no longer justify their performance
in education in terms of inputs; that is, in terms of
the amount of new money they have provided, or
the number of new teachers they have employed,
or the range of new computers they have installed.
It has been observed that ‘today, educators need to
show how they have transformed current and new
dollars into student achievement results, or the
argument that education needs more - or even the
current level of - money will be unlikely to attract
public or political support’ (Odden and Picus, 2008,
p. 26). Output measures, particularly those related
to student achievement, are the new bottom line
in education.
The emphasis on accountability through external
testing is driven by the growing realisation
that education is a major factor in economic
development and the consequent understanding
that it is the quality of education that is most
important (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007).
Accountability for quality has been given a harder
edge, often in the face of opposition from the
education profession, through standardised tests of
cognitive skills (Popham, 2003).
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• The development of output measurement;

• Evidence of their effectiveness; and,
• Implications for Australia.
The essay argues that performance measures
constitute a positive shift in education but they
haven’t gone far enough. More work needs to be
done in evaluating the programs that are meant to
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improve student performance. The programs that
are designed for the most disadvantaged students
often escape any systematic form of evaluation
yet systems need to formally identify what actually
works, and doesn’t work, in schools.

What is output measurement
and why is it here?
Accountability systems have been defined as those
that ‘combine clear standards, external monitoring
of results, and corresponding rewards and sanctions
based on performance indicators’ (OECD, 2007a,
p. 9).
The rise of accountability in education is due
primarily to the very significant investments made
into education. A recent McKinsey report found
that despite ‘massive’ spending on education by
the world’s governments, totalling $2 trillion in
2006, performance has barely improved in decades
(McKinsey and Company, 2007). Other research
has come to similar findings (Hanushek, 1997;
Hanushek & Rivkin, 1997; Hanushek and Wößmann,
2007; Pritchett, 2003; Odden and Picus, 2008; Leigh
and Ryan, 2008). Pritchett reproduces findings by
Gundlach, Wößmann & Gmelin (2000) that over
the period 1970-94, nearly every OECD country
witnessed an enormous expansion in expenditures
per pupil, while their maths and science performance
either flat-lined or deteriorated (see Figure 1).
The fact that funding does not often correlate
with performance is a reason for the focus on
outputs in education. Outputs can be defined as
an individual’s, school’s, or nation’s performance, as

measured by standardised tests. A standardised test
is one where the method of administering the test,
including the test conditions and system of scoring,
is regulated and controlled so that it is consistently
applied across multiple groups. The purpose of
standardised tests is to better judge achievement by
relating performance (whether it be by the student,
teacher, school, or nation), to a wider population.
Output measures have been used in the past to
criticise education systems and will continue to
be used for this purpose. Further, the relationship
between funding and output measures has been
the subject of heated academic debate (see, for
example, Hanushek, 1996, and Greenwald, Hedges
and Laine, 1996a & 1996b). But output measures
are also an extremely powerful rationale to continue
justifying increased spending on education.

Key features of output
measurement systems
The two main features that distinguish output
measurement systems are whether:
a) They have penalties attached or not; and
whether,
b) They are national in scope or not.
The United States (US) is an example of a system
that has penalties attached but is not nationally
organised, while Australia’s system is national but
does not lead to any specific penalties.
Assessments with penalties attached are often
referred to as ‘high stakes.’ This term should
probably be confined to instances where tests are
truly ‘high stakes,’ such as in exit school examinations
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Figure 1: Spending and outcomes in the OECD
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or medical entrance exams, both of which have
immediate consequences for the individuals who
sit them. The type of assessments we are referring
to are a form of ‘standards test;’ quality control
systems designed to keep schools, and school
systems on their toes rather than being ‘high stakes’
for the individuals who complete them.

The United States
The US example illustrates how the emphasis on
education measurement combines with a faith
in the free market. The efficient operation of any
market requires good information and this is exactly
what student testing provides.The idea that market
forces can advance society much more effectively
than government intervention is, in fact, one of the
major reasons behind the introduction of student
testing on a large scale.
In the US, standardised achievement tests have been
designed to facilitate a market in education services
by increasing competition and choice.The US No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) Act was introduced to Congress in
2001 and signed into law by President Bush in January
2002 (NCLB, 2002). Colloquially referred to as the No
Child Left Untested Act, this law encourages students
to move schools and for schools to be restructured
as a consequence of continued poor performance in
testing. Schools not making progress face ‘increasingly
rigorous sanctions designed to bring about meaningful
change,’ ranging from supporting students to transfer
to other public schools to restructuring schools (US
Department of Education, 2002, p. 17). Thus the
description, ‘high stakes,’ which, as mentioned above, is
probably a misnomer.
The language that inaugurated the NCLB Act is
almost exactly the same as that which heralded the
start of national student testing in Australia, both of
which occurred in 2001. Dr David Kemp, Australia’s
Education Minister at the time, observed that, ‘this
agenda is all about parents’ rights to have objective
standards against which they can compare their
child’s and their school’s performance’ (Kemp,
2000) while the NCLB Act was designed, ‘so that
students, teachers, parents, and administrators can
measure progress against common expectations
for student academic achievement’ (NCLB Act, Sec
1001, paragraph 1). Information was the crucial
issue in both cases, linked in both cases to a desire
for a more open market in education.
Conventional wisdom in the US is that the NCLB
Act is ‘on target’ but experts in educational
measurement note that while it has inaugurated a
‘testing revolution,’ the law is based on ‘the nearly
unchallenged belief, with very little supporting
evidence, that high-stakes testing can and will lead
to improved education’: ‘Apparently, most policymakers assume that accountability in education can
be accomplished only through the imposition of

high-stakes testing, although there is no compelling
body of evidence to support that assumption’
(Brennan, 2006, p. 10).
It remains to be seen whether the US experience
is an aberration or a harbinger of change. The US
Department of Education points to significant,
quantifiable gains resulting from the NCLB Act (US
Department of Education, 2007), while the former
president of the American Educational Research
Association, David Berliner, believes these gains to
be illusory:
If the intended goal of high-stakes testing policy
is to increase student learning, then that policy
is not working. While a state’s high-stakes test
may show increased scores, there is little support
in these data that such increases are anything
but the result of test preparation and/or the
exclusion of students from the testing process
(Amrien and Berliner, 2002).

Australia
Australia’s system of measuring student
performance has a unified, national scope although
Australia’s non-financial school data (the subject of
this essay) is much more organised than its financial
data (see Dowling, 2008).
Figure 2 shows a time-line for the introduction
of national testing in Australia. What becomes
immediately apparent is that politics and technology
are closely linked in this chronology. The viability
of national testing in Australia was dependent on
the States and Territories maintaining ownership
of the testing process, which was facilitated by the
Rasch model of measurement that helped different
tests be equated so that national data could be
derived.1 Moreover, Item Response Theory (IRT),
of which the Rasch model is a part, had only been
readily accessible, from a practical point of view, for
about a quarter of a century, with the introduction
of relatively fast microcomputers in the 1980s
(Brennan, 2006). But if Australia shows that student
testing is a product of its time, it remains to be seen
whether standards testing has come of age.
The question arises as to whether Australia will
attach penalties to its national testing, and whether
this development is inevitable. Australia currently
does not have the same penalties attached to student
testing as the US but the architecture is in place,
to a greater degree than in the US, for individual
schools to be compared on national tests. Part of
the answer to Australia’s direction lies in what other
high performing countries are doing in this area.
1

Georg Rasch (1901 - 1980), a Danish mathematician, statistician,
and psychometrician, created models that allowed items from
different tests to be equated onto a common measurement
scale. This in turn meant that test equating was more feasible and
defensible (Sadeghi, 2006, p. 2 & 8).
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1999

2000

2002

2003

2005

2006

2004 – First national sample assessment of Year
6 and Year 10 students in Civics and Citizenship,
to be repeated once every three years.

2004 – Reporting to parents of their child’s
achievement against literacy and numeracy
benchmarks.

2004

Figure 2: Timeline of national student testing in Australia

2007

2005 – First national sample assessment of Year 6
and Year 10 students in Information and
Communication Technology (ICT), to be repeated
once every three years.

2005 – Reporting of benchmark data to occur by
geographic location classification.

2003 – First national sample assessment of Science literacy of
Year 6 students, to be repeated once every three years. OECD’s
Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) to assess
Science literacy for secondary students.

2001 – Year 7 literacy and
numeracy benchmarks reported
for 2001 and subsequent years.

2001

2000 – Years 3 and 5 numeracy benchmarks
reported for 2000 and subsequent years.

1998

1997 – National Literacy Plan proposed by the
Commonwealth adopted by States. The plan is for States to
conduct their own literacy and numeracy tests with national
benchmark data later derived from these State tests.

1997

2001 – Performance, Measurement and Reporting
Taskforce (PMRT) takes over work of the NEPMT.

1999 – Years 3 and 5 literacy benchmarks reported
for 1999 and subsequent years.

1999 – National Education Performance Monitoring
Taskforce (NEPMT) established. Benchmark results
to be reported for all students by gender, language
background other than English and by Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander background.

2008

2008 – State tests replaced by a National Assessment Program in Literacy
and Numeracy (NAPLAN). For the first time in Australia, students in Years
3, 5, 7 and 9 will undertake the same national tests in literacy and
numeracy. States continue to manage delivery and administration as well
as analysis and reporting of results.

What other countries are doing
Output measures that compare schools with each
other and with national averages are surprisingly
under-developed in high performing OECD
countries. Two related OECD studies recently
correlated all features of accountability, autonomy
and choice at the country level with the 2003
Program of International Student Assessment (PISA).
A ‘performance study’ correlated achievement data
while an ‘equity study’ correlated relevant data from
hundreds of thousands of students from various
OECD countries (OECD, 2007a & OECD, 2007b).
In compiling this study, the school background
questionnaires from the 2003 PISA were used to
construct country aggregate means of accountability,
which are reproduced in Table 1.
Table 1: OECD country means: use of comparative
assessments (in descending order)

Country
United States
United Kingdom
New Zealand
Hungary
Iceland
Sweden
Poland
Canada
Norway
Netherlands
Korea
Turkey
Finland
Australia
Mexico
Czech Republic
Slovak Republic
Italy
Portugal
Luxembourg
Germany
Switzerland
Spain
Japan
Ireland
Austria
Greece
Belgium
Denmark

Assessments for:
Comparing
Comparing
to district
to other
and nation
schools
0.91
0.80
0.89
0.84
0.87
0.74
0.86
0.77
0.84
0.66
0.73
0.65
0.71
0.62
0.70
0.53
0.64
0.47
0.63
0.47
0.62
0.55
0.59
n/a
0.56
0.35
0.55
0.39
0.55
n/a
0.50
0.55
0.46
0.48
0.33
0.29
0.33
0.22
0.22
0.10
0.21
0.17
0.19
0.16
0.18
0.17
0.18
0.12
0.17
0.09
0.12
0.38
0.12
0.16
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.03

The consistently best performing OECD countries
on PISA (Finland, Japan, the Netherlands and
Korea; Chinese Taipei not represented in the list)
are clustered in the middle of the group, with
Japan near the bottom. These countries’ high
academic performance is clearly not matched by
their willingness to compare schools to district or
national performance, or with each other.
What is also surprising is that none of the top
performing OECD countries (Finland, Japan, the
Netherlands, Korea, Chinese Taipei) have any
form of national assessment, certainly none that
compares to Australia. The situation in each of
these countries is summarised in Box 1 below, by
alphabetical order of country:
Box 1: Student testing regimes in high-performing
OECD countries

Chinese Taipei
In ChineseTaipei,there are no national assessments
of student progress for accountability purposes
although recently, national admission tests have
been introduced. Since 2006, all Taiwanese juniorhigh students (aged 14 - 15 years) have to take
the Basic CompetenceTest (BCT) held twice each
year. A BCT has also been introduced for sixth
grade students (aged 11 - 12 years) in Chinese
and Mathematics (this test also asks students to
identify the amount of TV watched every day
and the amount of daily computer usage time).
The purpose of the year 6 test results is to act
as a reference only to teaching practices and is
not made available to the public (Chang, Lee, and
Yeh, 2006).

Finland
Finland leads the world in literacy and numeracy
yet it has no large-scale testing programs in
its elementary schools. In the 1990s, Finland
abandoned uniformity in curriculum content
and moved to basing their teaching and learning
on curriculum standards while allowing schools
flexibility in the content of the curriculum in
achieving these standards (Ministry of Education,
2006).

Japan
In 2007, the Japanese Education Ministry, through
the National Institute for Educational Research
(NIER), conducted its first national survey
of school academic achievement in 43 years.
A Nationwide Academic Ability Assessment
(NAAA) is now administered to students in the
final year of primary education (11 - 12 years
of age) and in the final year of lower secondary
school (14 -15 years of age). These tests assess
reading, writing and maths, and also ask about

Source: OECD, 2007a & b, Table A.2 (Appendix A.3).
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students’ eagerness to learn and their daily life
habits, including questions such as how many
hours they study at home and whether they
eat breakfast every morning. Test results are not
publicly announced. Instead, local governments
and schools receive information on the results.
Schools can then determine their position by
comparing the national averages, which will be
announced by the Government. Students are
informed of their results (Andrews, C. et al,
2007).

Korea
Korea does not have a national assessment of
student progress for accountability purposes
but does have a national sample of student
achievement, the principal aim of which is
to monitor the curriculum. Small samples of
students (0.5 to one per cent of the whole
student population) in Years 6 (aged 11-12 years),
Year 9 (aged 14-15 years) and Year 10 (aged 1516 years) are involved in the assessments and
two subjects are assessed each year, usually on
a rotating basis. Korea has recently moved to a
formal written test rather than multiple choice
assessments for these national sample tests
(KICE, 2007 and Andrews, C. et al, 2007).

The Netherlands
The Netherlands do not appear to have national
assessment of student progress for accountability
purposes. There is national assessment
conducted once every five years in the final
year of primary school, when students are 12
years of age (known as CITO tests), which relate
students’ achievement to the main objectives of
primary education (CITO, 2006). There is also a
compulsory test at 15 years of age but this is
only intended to help guide students’ progression
to the appropriate school and course type
(Andrews, C. et al, 2007).

The United Kingdom
The UK has developed national student tests for
accountability purposes from a very early stage.
A ‘Foundation Stage Profile’ (to be replaced with
an ‘Early Years Foundation Stage Profile’ in 2008)
assesses children’s progress and learning needs
from age three to the end of the academic year
in which a child has their fifth birthday (Andrews,
C. et al, 2007).
In regard to national school assessments, all
students in maintained (publicly funded) schools
(and some in private, independent schools), at
the ages of 7, 11 and 14 are assessed via National
Curriculum Assessment, the purpose of which is
to improve teaching and learning and provide

6

information for parents and the public to help them
judge the quality of the education being provided.
Independent (private) schools are encouraged,
but not required, to take part in these statutory
assessments. Statutory assessments involve
externally set and marked tests which have so far
focused on English, mathematics and science.
If there is a link between output testing and
performance, one would have thought that
advanced directions in education measurement
would be most likely evident in countries at
the forefront of educational performance and
improvement (assuming, of course, that academic
results say something about education systems).
But as the information in Box 1 makes clear, this is
not the case.
In Box 1, the country with the most developed
forms of national assessment, particularly for
accountability purposes, is the UK, even though it is
the lowest performing country amongst this group
of very high performing countries as measured on
PISA tests. There are three possible explanations
for this phenomenon:
a) National testing for accountability purposes
does not improve student performance;
b) National testing for accountability purposes
does improve student performance and, if
introduced, would lift the performance of high
performing countries even higher; or
c) Testing for accountability decreases as
performance increases, as there is a decreased
need to monitor performance.
Of course, there are many reasons behind the
superiority of Finland, Japan, Korea, Chinese Taipei
and the Netherlands on PISA tests that have nothing
to do with educational measurement.These reasons
include cohesive social structures and relative cultural
homogeneity. But it would be interesting if these
countries’ performance improved if accountability
requirements, based on national tests of cognitive
skills, were also introduced on a wider basis.

Opposing views on output
measures and performance
The OECD studies mentioned above found that
although the highest performing OECD countries
only moderately use comparative tests, all types of
accountability systems were, in general, effective,
whether they were aimed at the student, teacher,
or the school. Although the OECD authors advised
caution in interpreting their school accountability
results, the result was that students perform better
when their schools use assessments to compare
themselves to district or national performance
(OECD, 2007a, p. 29).

These findings contradict previous research,
which has found that a jurisdictional emphasis on
testing for accountability purposes was generally
ineffective. For example, an influential study of the
performance of fifty states in America found that
states that developed extensive testing systems
coupled with rewards and sanctions failed to
improve student performance, according to US
National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) longitudinal data, while states that invested
heavily in teacher education and standards did
improve (Darling-Hammond, 2000). The recent
OECD study contradicts this finding. In fact, the
OECD performance study found that testing
for accountability, combined with autonomy and
choice for schools, produce students who ‘perform
substantially better on cognitive skills in mathematics,
science and reading as tested in PISA 2003 than do
students in school systems with less accountability,
autonomy, and choice’ (OECD, 2007a, p. 58).
The OECD researchers explained this effect as due
to better alignment between principals and agents.
One example of a principal-agent relationship in
education is when a principal (e.g., the parent)
commissions an agent (e.g., the head of a school) to
perform a service (the education of the child) on
her behalf. Another example is when a government
(the principal) commissions an education authority
(the agent) to improve school results (the service)
for a given state. In both cases, incentives can be
introduced to make the agent do what the principal
wants, particularly if the agent’s interests differ from
that of the principal.

Counter-arguments
The problem noted by many educators is that the
agent may well do what the principal wants, but at
the expense of a good education. This is essentially
what David Berliner says the NCLB Act is doing;
increasing scores by narrowing focus. Others have
gone further, stating that the US accountability
regimes create perverse incentives, such as
‘curricular reductionism, excessive test-focused
drilling, and the modelling of dishonesty [where
teachers act fraudulently to increase test scores]’
(Popham, 2003, p.12). The claim of dishonesty is
levelled system-wide, with the claim that actors in
accountability systems collude in meeting specified
targets so that the targets eventually ‘bear as much
likeness to reality as did the production goals of
the former USSR’ (Mortimore, 2008). There is a
widespread belief that these accountability systems,
at the very least, force teachers to teach to the
test: ‘The notion that testing limits the nature of
teaching is pervasive’ (Pellegrino, 2004, p.8).
The putative loss of a better, wider education
remains at the level of anecdote precisely because
it cannot be measured. But its relevance can be

gauged by explanations offered for why money
appears to have such a low impact on student
performance. One reason given is that most of the
extra money has been spent on non-core subjects
(such as art, music, physical education, drama,
health, vocational education, etc) and students with
special needs, precisely those subjects and students
who are not assessed through standardised tests
(Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 184). The notion that
scores are related to what is spent suggests that
educational measurement may construct new
values in the classroom.
The common view that testing is not the same as
learning (and may in fact be harmed by excessive
testing), has no empirical basis; yet is supported by
economic explanations for the low impact money
has on student performance (namely, that the
money is not focused narrowly enough). However,
if studies such as those produced by the OECD
continue to find performance improvement
through comparative output measures, then the
use of these systems will increase. In this context,
more definitive research on the US experience will
be crucial.

Lessons for Australia
It is unlikely that the Australian system will attach
penalties to its assessment regime in the near future.
The fact that many high performing countries do
not do this and a large proportion of the education
community is opposed to it would seem to settle the
matter. But if more and more countries do take this
path and if technological developments allow school
and teacher effects to be more precisely identified,
then the pressure will grow for Australia to move
in this direction. In this context, the development of
value-added assessment may be important.
Value-added assessment is a trend that has come
from within the education sector, largely in response
to that sector’s resistance to other forms of
accountability systems. If any accountability system is
to be imposed on education, most educators would
prefer it to be one that isolates their effects. This is
what value-added assessment promises to do.
Value-added assessment focuses on a student’s
growth over a given period of time rather than
the absolute levels they attain at a point in time.
Theoretically, growth reveals the effects of schools
and teachers while achievement does not. However,
there are significant problems with value-added
assessments, including:
• Most value-added approaches remain highly
technical.
• Creating vertical scales is not only statistically
challenging, but may introduce more error in
longitudinal analysis.
7

• Missing data on student performance, as
well as data linking students to teachers,
may become a significant problem as large
proportions of students transfer among
schools every year.
• It is unclear whether the estimate obtained
from a value-added model could be called a
teacher or school effect, when all the other
factors that influence a student’s score are
taken into account.
(Rand Corporation, 2004 & Doran and Fleischman, 2005).

In 2004, the Rand Corporation advised that ‘the
current research base is insufficient to support
the use of value-added modelling for high stakes
decisions.’ But value-added software programs
are becoming more widely available, even if
implementing these models remains complex
(Doran and Fleischman, 2005). The fact that
Australia’s new national assessment program will
continue to use the Rasch model for both vertical
and horizontal equating suggests the eventual
arrival of value-added assessments, despite
the implementation problems.2 As this occurs,
technological developments that isolate the effect
of individual schools and teachers on student
performance will only increase the pressure to use
these measures for accountability purposes.
Testing may also revert to its tradition role as a
diagnostic rather than accountability tool. It has been
predicted that the type of mass testing introduced
by the NCLB Act and national benchmarking
in Australia will eventually be considered a
quaint anachronism: ‘In 21st century learning
environments, decontextualised, drop-in-from-thesky assessments consisting of isolated tasks and
performances will have zero validity as indices of
educational attainments’ (Pellegrino, 2004). Rather,
assessment will become much more targeted
at mapping students’ knowledge and diagnosing
students’ misconceptions about specific topics.
The trend towards individual diagnosis matches
the laudable move towards ‘personalisation’ in
education, where schools are moving away from
Fordist principles of standardised mass production
to systems that are fashioned for the individual
(Leadbeater, 2004). However, this trend towards
the individual would not supplant the equally strong
need for increased accountability of systems. In fact,
this essay argues that accountability should be even
more deeply embedded into education practice. It
remains the case that there is generally no culture
of measuring program effectiveness at the school
2
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Horizontal equating places on a common scale tests of the same
difficulty while vertical equating places on a common scale tests of
different difficulty, usually tests across different year levels, thus allowing
longitudinal analysis of individual student performance. Australia’s
assessment will be both vertical and horizontal in the sense that tests
at each grade level are equated from one year to the next.

level in Australia, or in most other countries. The
practice of benchmarking and public identification
of ‘better’ or ‘worse’ activities in schools is rarely
conducted in any formal way. For example, one of
the few evaluations of equity programs in New
South Wales public schools proposed a system of
continuous monitoring, review and accountability
on the assumption that ‘it is essential to identify
programs that are successful in promoting better
outcomes for disadvantaged students’ (Lamb &
Teese, 2005). However, as one of the report’s
authors, Stephen Lamb, subsequently noted, it was
a continuing problem world-wide that systems
simply allocated resources to schools without a
clear idea on how they would or should be spent
(The Australian, 7 July, 2008). It remains the case that
programs and initiatives designed for disadvantaged
students frequently escape any systematic scrutiny
of their effects.
The reluctance to evaluate also extends to teaching
practice. A recent study of the teaching profession
found that it ‘does not have well-established
institutions or procedures for using research to
identify and define standards for what its members
should know and be able to do - normative
structures relating to good practice are weak’
(ACER, 2008).Yet educators need to know, in more
detail than they do, what works and doesn’t work
in schools. It would be a positive result if output
measures extended further into education, so
that school programs were regularly and formally
evaluated in terms of their effectiveness.

Conclusion
Educational assessment is not a new concept. China
used student tests 3,000 years ago and introduced a
national civil service examination system 1,500 years
ago, while modern educational test development
can be traced to the Industrial Revolution (Oakland
et al, 2001, p.4). Yet today’s emphasis on output
measurement is a new phenomenon, one that
can be traced to an evidence-based management
philosophy that first transformed Japanese industry
after the Second World War and was introduced
more broadly to the West in the 1980s.
There is no doubt that the changes inaugurated
by output measurement will be profound. This is in
contrast to a common view that policy changes in
education are invariably superficial and do not affect
the reality of school practice. In one striking analogy,
such policy changes are likened to a storm on the
ocean: ‘The surface is agitated and turbulent, while
the ocean floor is calm and serene (if a bit murky).
Policy churns dramatically, creating the appearance
of major changes ... while deep below the surface, life
goes on largely uninterrupted’ (quoted in McKinsey
and Company, 2007). Output measures will disturb

school life below the surface, mainly because of the
deep need for accountability it responds to and the
scale of change that is involved.
Output measures are the new currency of an
educational market; the new ‘bottom line’ upon
which schools, school systems, and increasingly
teachers, will be judged. This essay argues that
standardised performance measures should be
extended so that equity programs are also evaluated.
But the question of whether accountability systems
should have penalties attached to them is another
matter. Much will depend on authoritative studies of
existing initiatives and technological innovations will
also be important, particularly value-added models
that can isolate the impact of schools and teachers
on student performance. However, in either case,
the continuing role of standardised assessments in
providing reliable information for a new education
market is inevitable and justified.
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